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The Benefits and Costs of 
Alternative Strategies to Improve 
Educational Outcomes 
PETER F . ORAZEM , PA U L GLEWWE, AND 
HARRY PATRJNOS 
Benefits from Schooling 
Few empirical relationships have been investi-
gated more frequently than that between years 
of schooling and earnings. Hundreds of studies 
using a wide variety of datasets from devel-
oped countries, spanning many decades, and 
employing a lternative specifications to correct 
for various potential sources of bias, have con-
sistently found positive priva te returns per year 
of schooling.• Returns arc frequent ly equal to or 
above long-run average market returns to other 
investments. 
Estimated returns to schooling in developing 
countries have been comparable in magnitude to 
returns found in developed countries. Table 4 . 1 
presents o rdinary least squa res (OLS) estimates 
of returns from a standard Mincerian earnings 
function applied to sixty-three ho usehold da ta-
sets from fo rty-two developing countries. The 
results are presented separately for males and 
females and for urban and rura l residents. These 
• The opinions expressed are our o'' n and not neces-
sarily those or the World Bank. Amy Damon, Jean 
Fares, Deon Filmer, Sarojini Hirshberg, Manny Jtmenez. 
EliLabeth King, Claudio Montenegro, Annette Richter, 
Ray Robertson. and T. Paul Schultz provided advice on 
topics, content and relevant literature as we prepared 
background matenals ror this paper. Shiva Sikdar pro-
vided able research assistance. 
1 Card ( 1999) contains an excellent review or the various 
estimation methods and biases associated with analysis or 
the returns to schooling. It appears that returns to school-
ing generated by OLS estimation tend to understate true 
returns, although the bias appears to be small. 
2 We are indebted to Claudio Montenegro ror sharing 
these regressions resulb. 
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Table 4.1 . Sample statistics of estimated returns 
per year of schooling in developing countries 
Percentile ~· Female Urban Rural 
10 2.J 3.7 3.8 1.2 
25 45 8.9 6.3 5.4 
50 !i.2 10.3 9.2 s 
75 9.5 12.3 10.6 10.1 
90 11.4 13.2 II .6 12.6 
Average 72 9.8 8.3 7.5 
Standard 4.4 3.7 3.8 5 
deviation 
Skewness 1.2 - I -1.3 0.~ 
Correlation O.R5 0.85 
Note: Authors' compilat ions of estimated returns to 
schooling usmg a stanuan.l Minccrian earning> funcuon> 
applied to stxt)·thrcc hou,chold data,cts from fort)-t"o 
de,clopmg countries . . , hcse are the same data sets used for 
ligurc 4 .1, cx~cpt that .orne dataset. arc dropped because the) 
did not hme separate mformation on urban, rural. male. Jnd 
female earnings. We thank Claudio Montenegro for suppl) ing 
these esumates. 
datasets were selected because the variable defi-
nitions could be harmonized across countries 
and because separate returns could be estimated 
for men and women and for urban and rural 
residents.2 The same model was estimated for 
all countries so that the variation is not due to 
specification choice. Several interesting results 
are appa rent. 
First, private returns, estimated as the per-
centage increase in annual earnings obtained 
from an additional year of schooling, are almost 
universally positive. In only o ne case for women, 
four cases for men, three for urban residents and 
two for rural residents did educatio n fail to raise 
earnings. The interquartile range for estimated 
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real returns across countries varies from 5 to 
10 percent for men and from 9 to 12 percent 
for women. The interquartJle range for both 
urban and rural residents lies between 5 and II 
percent. The median return ranges from 8 to I 0 
percent per year of schooling, depending upon 
the demographic group. TillS is quite consistent 
with the average return of 10.9 percent for low-
income countries fou nd 111 the Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos (2004) literature survey of studies 
published in the 1990s. \\ hlle there is consider-
able variation in the magnitude of the return, 
there does appear to be a positive reward to 
mdividual time spent in sc.:hool. 
A second generalizatiOn is that in all but a 
handful of countries, estimated returns to school-
ing are higher for women than for men. Estimated 
returns average 7.2 percent for men and 9.8 per-
cent for women across the datasets. One might 
suspect that the difference in returns is due to a 
selection problem a lower proportion of women 
than men arc engaged 111 wage work, and so 
one might suspect that it ts the most productive 
women that are disproportionately drawn into 
the labor market. However, the direction of bias 
is not obvious women \\ ho opt not to enter the 
labor market will have a value of time in non-
market activities that exceeds their market value, 
and so the bias could go in the opposite direction. 
However evidence presented by Schultz ( 1999) 
and Duraisamy (2002) suggests that selection has 
similar effects for men and women. 3 
A third notable finding is that in about two-
thirds of the countries, returns to urban resi-
dents exceed those of rural residents, although 
the differences are smaller than those between 
men and women. Estimated returns average 8.3 
percent for urban workers and 7.5 percent for 
rural workers. Again, one might suspect that 
the returns to rural workers are biased upward 
because a disproportionate share of rural work-
ers will work without wages on home enterprises 
or farms. Again, the direction of bias is unclear, 
as those opting to work on a farm will have a 
higher value of time than their market oppor-
tunities. Additionally, higher wages in cities 
create an incentive to migrate from rural to 
urban markets, and so rural residents with the 
highest market skills will likely have moved to 
the cities. 
Finally, the most telling result from the 
analysis of differences in returns to schooling 
across groups within countries is that the difler-
ences are so small. Estimated returns arc very 
highly correlated across groups. The correla-
tion in returns is 0.85 both between men and 
women and between urban and rural residents. 
Labor markets that reward education highly for 
men also reward education highly for women. 
Countries with high returns to education in their 
urban labor markets also have high returns to 
education in their rural labor market. 
These returns suggest that across a wide array 
of countries at all stages of development, educa-
tion consistently offers sizeable positive returns 
to wage earners not only to urban male 
youths, but also to women and rural youths. 
Nevertheless, a year of schooling will be more 
productive in some environments than in others. 
All of the distributions of returns in table 4.1 are 
skewed downward, and so there is a tendency 
to have more extreme outliers at the bottom 
than the top. One reason that is quite plausible 
but is difficult to illustrate easily is that school 
quality differs across countries. However, if 
the economic environment rewards educational 
investments, then developing country parents 
have an incentive to seek private schools when 
the public schools are of low quality. Therefore, 
it is useful to examine other reasons why coun-
tries or their citizens may not capture the reward 
from schooling found in other countries. 
Where Are Benefits from Schooling 
Greatest? 
Schultz ( 1975) noted that human capital is 
most valuable in disequilibrium environments. 
1 One exception to this generalization that women have 
higher returns to schooling than men appears in Iran~i­
tion economics. On average. women's rate of return 
10 secondary education is 0.6 percentage points lower 
and their return to university ed ucation is 1.3 per-
centage points lower than estimated returns for men 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). 
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Writing from the perspective of agricultural 
economies, Schultz argued that in the absence 
of technological change, production shocks, or 
price shocks, traditional rules of thumb on how 
to efficiently manage a farm would be adequate. 
Consistent with that presumption, Fafchamps 
and Quisumbing ( 1999) and Godoy et at. (2005) 
found that schooling bas a negligible effect on 
productivity on traditional farms, even though 
schooling raises earnings in the same locations 
for farmers engaged in wage work off the farm. 
On the other hand, human capital has been 
shown to play a very important role in agricul-
tural environments experiencing technological 
change. Huffman and Orazem (2006) show that 
the process of economic development almost 
universally requires an agricultural transition 
in which dramatic increases in the efficiency of 
food production simultaneously frees up labor 
for emerging industrial sectors while lowering 
the price of food (and hence raising real wages) 
in urban areas. The most educated farmers are 
the first to adopt improved varieties, equip-
ment, and production practices (Huffman 1977; 
Beslcy and Case 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 
2004a; Abdulai and Huffman 2005). In India, 
returns to schooling were highest in a reas where 
Green Revolution technologies were most com-
plementary with local agriculture (Foster and 
Rosenzweig 1996). 
In order for human capital to atta in its high-
est returns, labor must be able to adapt to dis-
equilibria, whether by moving to industries or 
a reas with the strongest labor demand, adopting 
4 Accmoglu er a/. (2001 ); Accmoglu er a/. (2002) have 
examined the role of institutions that constra in or enhance 
mobility and the exercise of property rights in retarding 
or fostering economic growth. 
' Information on the Heritage Foundation Index is avail-
able at www.hcritage.org/research/features/index/chap-
ters/pdfs/l ndex2006_ Cha p5. pdf. 
6 The negative estimated returns to schooling came from 
Azerbaijan in 1995; Moldova in 1998; Cambodia in 1997; 
and Vietnam in 1992 altho ugh Moock er al. (2003) found 
small but positive returns for Vietnam in 1992- 3. More 
recent surveys available for Cambodia and Vietnam have 
generated positive returns to schooling as those countries 
have liberali.a:d their economies and improved the cli-
mate for protection of property. 
or develo ping new technologies, or switchmg 
occupations to fulfi ll market needs. Good adap-
tive decisions require a reward, and so human 
capita l will be most va luable when social or 
governmental institutions place few restrictions 
on mobility or trade, when wages and prices are 
flexible, and when property rights a re enforced.4 
There is no stronger evidence o f the role of freer 
markets in enhancing human capital productiv-
ity than in the rapid increase in returns to school-
ing observed in virtually all formerly planned 
economies as they made their transitions toward 
market system~ (Fleisher eta/. 2005). 
Sen ( 1999) further stipula tes that it is not so 
much any one economic institution as thecombi· 
nation of institutions that is important in defin-
ing economic freedom and the ability to ~eek 
rewards for skills. When we divide o ur countnes 
into groups based on their relative ranking m 
the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom 
Index,5 we get a picture of the importance of 
the overall economic environment in fostenng 
returns to schooling (figure 4.1 ). Because higher 
index scores sigmfy less economic freedom. 
countries whose index scores are in the lower 
half of the Economic Freedom Index have less 
regulated economics, fewer restrictions on trade, 
flexible wage and price adj ustments, and govern-
ment enforcement of property rights. Returns to 
schooling are, on average, j ust under I 0 percent 
in these "economically free" countries. In con-
trast, countries in the more regulated half of the 
Index have returns to schooling averaging onl] 
6.4 percent. The gap in average retu rns between 
more and less free countries is much larger than 
the gap in average returns between men and 
women or between urban and rural markets. 
Mo re economically free countries have higher 
average returns at both high and low levels 
o f average schooling, a proxy for the level of 
development in the country. This suggests that 
investments in schooling will be most valuable 
in countries that allow workers to find their 
highest returns across a lterna tive sectors and 
occupa tio ns.6 
There is considerable evidence that parents do 
respond to rising perceived returns to schooling. 
In India, Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) and 
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Figure 4. 1 Returns to schooling, hy lzigh and low values of the Heritage Economic Freedom Index: 
forty-six developing countries, various years, 1990 2004 
X ore: Dawused for table 4.1 are a sub-set of these datasers. 
Source. Alllhors' compilation oj\i\'ly-nine earnings regressions pro1•ided by Claudio Montenegro, using household 
data from forty-six cou11tnes 
Kochar (2004) fou nd that rura l enrollments rise 
in areas with greate r perceived returns to school-
ing due to techno logical innovatio ns o r rising 
urban dema nd for labor. Evidence from So uth 
Asia and Central America suggests tha t the ra p-
idly growing export-oriented sectors dispropor-
tionately hired more educated youth, and tha t 
hiring has frequently targeted educated young 
women. This has helped to increase enroll-
ment fo r girl s even without an explicit program 
aimed a t ra ising gi rls' enrollment (Gruben and 
McLeod 2006). Nevertheless, these responses 
are predicated on the abili ty of human capita l 
to move to the a rea or sector where it can find 
its highest potential value in the economy, and 
o n parenta l a bili ty to perceive those potential 
rewards.7 
Of course, just spending time in school is not 
enough to generate a return. More important 
is what is learned during the time in school. 
Investme nts o f time and money in a child's 
schooling t ha t fa il to prod uce basic cognitive 
skills such as literacy are almost surely wasted. In 
fact, studies that include both years of schooling 
7 Dati and Ravallion (2002) argue that econo mic growth 
in India ha~ tended to benefit most those groups with 
more schooling. Sources of growth were complementary 
with skills. Thi~ is consistent with the recommendation 
that efforts to fight poverty through growth must include 
measures to raise the human capital of the poor. 
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of self-reported literacy by grade attainment for youth aged 15- 24. various 
countries 
Source: alllhors' compilation ofsummary data from seventy-three household sun-eys spamringfifty-seren 
developing countries provided by Claudio Montenegro 
and measures of cognitive skills find that it is 
the latter and not the former that drive earn-
ings (Glewwe 2002). Similarly, Haoushek and 
Kimko (2000) found that it is average cognitive 
attainment and not average years of schooling 
that drives economic growth. More recently, 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) show that the 
cognitive skills of the population rather than 
mere school attainment - are powerfully related 
to individual earnings, to the distribution of 
income, and to economic growth. Their empiri-
cal results show the importance o f both mjnimal 
and high level skills, the complementarity of 
skills and the quality of economic institutions, 
and the robustness of the relationship between 
skj lls and growth. 
While time in school does not guarantee 
the acquisition of cogni tive skills, it is almo~t 
impossible to acquire those skills without formal 
schooling. As shown in figure 4.2, the probabil-
ity of attaining self-reported literacy rises with 
years of schooling, a lthough there is consider-
able varia tion in the pattern across countrie~. 
Children who complete the primary cycle, about 
six years of schooling, are almost certain to 
attain literacy in most countries. While it tS 
theoretically possible that these children could 
have attained li teracy without schooling, figure 
4.2 shows that relatively few literate individu-
als never attended school. This presumption 
that schooling is needed for literacy underlies 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of 
The Benefits and Costs of Alternative Strategies to Improve Educational Outcomes 185 
attaining universal primary education (UPE) 
by2015. 
Various estimates generated by UNESCO, 
U ICEF, and the World Bank place the 
annual additional cost of a ttaining UPE at 
between $9 billion and $34 billion. These esti-
ma tes use various applications of procedures 
that apply current average costs of schooling 
to the fraction of children not in school. Even 
these high costs may be under-stated because 
the children who are currently not in school 
are disproportionately located in areas that are 
expensive to reach with schooling services or in 
households that are less keen to send children 
to school.8 Others are not in school despite 
having access to local schools, and so adding 
more supply will not address the problem. We 
argue that in order to make efficient progress 
toward the UPE goal , we need to identify 
which illiterate popula tions can be served most 
economically. 
Should Investments Concentrate on the 
Primary Level or Other Levels? 
Much of our discussion will concentrate on rais-
ing the fraction of literate adults in the world, 
but for many developing countries that have 
already a ttained UPE, that level of schooling 
is no longer relevant. It is useful to comment 
briefly on why we focus on lower levels of 
schooling in identifying the highest benefit to 
cost interventions in the schooling arena. 
It has commonly been presumed that school-
ing is subject to diminishing returns, so that the 
returns to primary schooling would exceed those 
for higher levels of schooling. Estimates of social 
returns to schooling reported by Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos (2004) support that conjecture. 
Reported per capita schooling costs a lso suggest 
that the highest returns must be at the lowest 
levels: Government per pupil costs for second-
ary schools in low-income countries are more 
than double the costs for primary schools, and 
the per-pupil tertiary costs are nearly thirty-four 
times the primary costs. It is unlikely that any 
gains in relative private returns are la rge enough 
to reverse the pattern of diminishing social 
returns to schooling. 
Both theoretical arguments and empirical evi-
dence support the view that interventions early 
in life have the highest returns. Carneiro and 
Heckman (2003) and Heckman and Mastcrov 
(2007) present a wealth of evidence that earlier 
investments in human capital, including those 
occurring before the start of formal school-
ing, are far more cost-effective than efforts 
to improve schooling later in life. It seems 
that because human capital development builds 
upon past accumulations of human capital, it is 
extremely important to develop a strong human 
capital base at an early age. Numerous patholo-
gies including criminal activities, drug abuse, 
idleness, and chronic illnesses can be linked to 
a weak human capital foundation in the form 
of malnutrition, bad health, and poor schooling 
experienced at the youngest ages. 
Nevertheless, in some settings, particularly 
those of more advanced developing countries, 
returns may be substantial at the secondary or 
even tertiary level. In industrialized economies, 
private returns to tertiary schooling rose relative 
to returns to secondary schooling as new technolo-
gies and investments in capital complemented the 
skills of college graduates (Schultz 2004b). One 
might suspect that similar changes are increasing 
the private returns to those with secondary or ter-
tiary educations in developing countries. 
This is particularly true in countries with strong 
growth in export trade. Xu (2000) argued that a 
developing country can expect to attract tech-
nology from multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
only if it has an adult population that meets 
a threshold level of education of roughly ten 
years of completed schooling. That assessment 
is consistent with findings that workers in for-
eign-owned enterprises in Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Guatemala, and elsewhere tend to 
be drawn from the upper tail of the schooling 
distribution in those countries (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik 2007), although the experience in 
Mexico appears to be in the opposite direction 
8 Glewwe and Zhao (2006) present a summary of these 
estimates and a critique of the methodologies employed. 
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(Robertson 2004). It is plausible that the rising 
returns to skill in the export sectors occur when 
there is insufficient migration toward growing 
sectors of the economy and/or because there 
is an insufficient supply of the types of skills 
exporters demand. 
The OECD (2000) has revised the definition 
of literacy, going well beyond basic facility 
with reading and mathematics to incorporate 
functioning efficiently in the information age. 
This presents another illustration of the Schultz 
hypothesis: The level of minimal functiona l lit-
eracy rises with the level and complexity of the 
economic envi ronment. As a country develops, 
the minimal level of schooling required to func-
tion effectively will increase. However, in those 
economies, many of the barriers to obtaining 
the requisite skills will be falling as the country 
progresses. The countries we will focus on here 
have not yet atta ined that level of development 
for a large portion of their citizenry. 
If Parents Respond to Returns, 
What is the Public Role in Schooling 
Investments? 
As argued above (p. 182) parents increase the 
intensity of their investments in schooling when 
expected returns rise. If this is true, then why 
don't parents select the efficient amount of time 
to send their children to school, the time at 
which the private rate of return to an additional 
year of schooling is equal to the market rate of 
return to other investments of comparable risk? 
Either there must be returns to schooling that 
are not captured by the households or there 
must be constraints on household schooling 
investments that prevent them from selecting the 
optimal investment. 
Several external benefits are frequently 
9 One could argue that to the extent tha t these transfers 
of schooling and health are confined within dynastic 
households, they arc no t really ex terna lities. Parents will 
get utility from their children's health or future welfare. 
evert he less, there may still be external benefits to having 
healthier and more educated progeny that are not fully 
captured by the parents and their children. 
associated with women's schooling. The fer-
tility transition, the common finding that the 
number of children per woman declines as tx:o-
nomic growth occurs, has been tied to increa~-s 
in women's value of time as their educatton 
increases (King and Mason 200 1; Schultz 2002). 
Angrist et a/. (2002) and Schul tz (2004a) both 
found that increased schooling from random!~ 
assigned vouchers and conditional cash transfers 
led to reduced ferti lity, although theevidencewa~ 
somewhat weaker in the latter case. I ncrease~ in 
women's (and men's) schooling has also been 
associated with improvements in the health of 
their children and other family members, \\ith 
improvements in the schooling of their children 
- and, as a consequence, a rising quality of life 
from one generation to the next (de Walque 
2005; Oreopoulos eta/. 2006; Paxson and Schady 
2007). More schooling is associated with later 
age of marriage and lower teenage birth rate~. 
which improves the health and schooling out-
comes of the next generation (Black era/. 200-t 
2005a; Cardoso and Verner 2006). Many of tht 
most recent studies utilize changes in truanC) 
laws to generate plausibly exogenous changes 111 
years of schooling (e.g. Patrinos and Sakellariou 
2005), increasing the confidence that thesee!Tecb 
of parental schooling on children 's welfare are 
ca usal. While in developed countries, some stud-
ies find only modest effects of parental schooling 
on their children (Blacker a/. 2005b), the effect 
appears to be stronger in developing countries 
Markets are often credited with improving the 
allocation of resources in an economy, but those 
resource allocation decisions require agents who 
are able to absorb and react to information 
Schooling is credited with lowering search cosb 
and improving allocative efficiency, which has 
both private and social benefits. These efficienC} 
gains will be spread broadly in the economy. For 
example, better-educated people are better able 
to migrate from rural to urban markets or from 
less-productive to more-productive sectors, help-
ing those markets allocate labor efficiently. Thts 
implies that the economy will be producing more 
output from the same inputs, increasing the total 
size of the pie avai lable. Not all of these benefits 
will be captured by the migrants themselve~ 
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(for example, labor that does not migrate will 
get higher wages as the migrants pursue their 
interests). Returns to capital are a lso enhanced 
by efficient allocations of labor. 
Empirical studies have consistently found 
that it is the better educated who are the most 
likely to adopt new technologies. Of course 
these agents are acting in their own self-interest, 
but there will be benefib that accrue to others 
as well. For example, because food demand is 
relatively inelastic, improved productivi ty in the 
agricultural sector from newly adopted tech-
nologies or enhanced fam1mg ability will lo wer 
food prices, which raises consumer surplus. 
Lower food prices will tend to raise the purchas-
ing power of urban wages and will hasten the 
shift of labor out of agnculture and into the 
industrialized secto r of the economy. 
From Foster and Rosenzweig's (2004b) anal-
ysis of the distribution of benefits from India's 
Green Revolution, it is apparent that the tech-
nologies were first adopted by relatively skilled 
farmers in areas with complementary land and 
irrigation. The social or private returns to the 
technology would have been negligible without 
a group of farmers able to successfully imple-
ment the technologies. Fall ing food prices did 
displace some farmers, but the displaced agricul-
ture labor fueled a rural industrialization. There 
was an expansion of man ufacturing employment 
and increased wages and incomes in rural areas 
that were less suited to the Green Revolution; 
those areas benefited from the increased pro-
ductivity of the fa rmers in the Green Revolution 
districts. 10 
Improved schooling opportunities can raise 
the quality of public servants and hence of 
public good provisio n. Indeed, improved human 
capital is believed to improve the quality of gov-
ernance in democracies. 11 
Another reason why private schooling deci-
sions may deviate from social optima is that 
parents may face borrowing costs tha t exceed 
the market interest rate. Becker and Tomes 
( 1986) showed that if households are credit con-
strained, they will under-invest in their chi ldren 's 
schooling, but all intergenera tional transfers will 
be in the form of human capital and not wealth. 
Households that are not credit constrained will 
invest optimally in their children 's schooling and 
then make any additional transfers in physical 
wealth. This may be why there is a stronger 
apparent tie between parental and children's 
schooling in developing countries. In developed 
countries, credit constraints may not be impor-
tant and so variation in children's schooling 
is not as strongly tied to parents' education or 
wealth (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Cameron 
and Taber 2004). However, substantial seg-
ments of poorer countries are more likely to 
face credit constraints that will limit children's 
schooling opportunities. 
The best evidence regarding these credit 
constraints is that child schooling appears to 
be atypically sensitive to unforeseen fluctua-
tions in househo ld income, positive or negative. 
Edmonds et a/. (2006) found tha t unexpected 
pension income raised schooling of grandchil-
dren in South Africa. In another setting, open-
ing the Vietnam market to trade caused rapid 
increases in household income tha t increased 
child schooling in Vietnam (Edmonds and 
Pavcnik 2006). Negative income shocks from 
weather or national recessions cause poor house-
holds to reduce child time in school (Jacoby and 
Skoufias 1997, 1998; Funkhouser 1999; G lewwe 
and Jacoby 2004; Thomas et a/. 2004). There 
is evidence that better educated parents can 
absorb these shocks more effectively (Glcwwe 
and Hall 1998). 
The existence of liquidity constraints creates a 
second role for government provision of school-
ing, even in the absence of external benefits. 
Under-investment in schooling by poor house-
holds means that the level of na tional skills will 
be lower than optimal. Furthermo re, the under-
investment will be concentrated among poor 
children who will then be consigned to poverty 
10 The need for educated farmers to adopt improved 
technologies that would raise food yields has become 
increasingly apparent with the run-up of food prices and 
their impact on poverty rates world\\ ide. This is one of 
the topics covered in the World Development Report 2008: 
A!{ricui/Ure for Developme/11 . 
11 Haveman and Wolfe (1984) have a detailed review of 
the sources of private and social returns to schooling. 
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Figure 4.3A Proportion of male and female urban population completing grades 1, 5, and 9 in 
se1·enty-two de1•eloping countries 
in the future due to their poor human capital 
endowments. Government provision of school-
ing can therefore also be justified as a means of 
equalizing the opportunity to escape poverty 
across households of varying economic status. 
Where are the Most Serious Gaps in 
Enrollment Rates? 
One of the MDGs is to attain universal primary 
education by 2015. Despite the consistency in 
estimated returns to schooling across coun-
tries, genders, and regions within countries, it is 
unlikely that this goal will be met. This section 
highlights which groups lag the furthest behind 
in attaining the goal, and which lagging groups 
can be aided in the most cost-effective manner. 
To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, 
we make use of seventy-two household datasets 
on schooling attainment compiled by Deon 
Filmer of the World Bank. All the datasets were 
collected between 2000 and 2006. We computed 
the fraction of 20-29-year-olds who completed 
grades I , 5, and 9 in order to show how rapidly 
educational attainment drops off in these de\ el-
oping countries. The grade 5 information is of 
particular interest, in that completion of fi\e 
years of schooling represents ncar assurance of 
lifetime literacy and numeracy. Separate esti-
mates were generated for males and females and 
for urban and rural residents. 
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show the first illustra-
tion. Each point represents paired male and 
female proportions of the 20 29-year-old popu-
lation that completed a given grade level in a 
country. Figure 4.3a shows the relationship for 
urban areas and figure 4.3b for rural areas. The 
dotted 45° line indicates combinations where 
males and females are equally likely to attain the 
grade level. Values on the axes range from 0 to I. 
with I representi ng universal attainment. Larger 
deviations from the upper right-hand point (1,1 l 
mean a greater gap from universal attainment of 
a given grade level. 
The average schooling attainment combina-
tions are a lso indicated for each grade level using 
dashed lines. Note that, by construction, the 
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Figure 4.38 Proportion of male and female rural population completing grades I, 5, and 9 in 
se1·enty-t11'0 del'eloping countrie.\ 
pattern of d ots will move toward the o rigin as 
the level of schooling increases because the frac-
tion completing grade 9 or more must be sma ller 
than the fractio n completmg at least grade 5 
which will , in turn , be smaller than the fractio n 
completing grade I. 
Severa l facts emerge. First, most of the grade 
5 points lie well below (l , I ), and so most devel-
oping countries have yet to meet the goal of 
UPE. This is particularly true in rura l areas. 
In urban a reas, the norm is for 77 percent o f 
women and 84 percent of men to complete grade 
5. In rura l a reas, the norms are 54 percent and 
63 percent , respectively. Aggregating across the 
seventy-two develo ping co untries using popula-
tion weights, 13 pe rcent of urban residents and 
28 percent of rura l residents fai l to complete 
five years o f schooling. Second, in both urban 
and rural markets most combina tions lie below 
the 45° line, indica ting that, on average, males 
are mo re like ly to reach each grade level than 
females. Wo men a re farther away from UPE 
than men. The population-weighted aggregates 
are tha t 20 percent of men and 26 pe rcent o f 
women fa il to complete five years of schooling . 
Nevertheless, in some countries, girls do receive 
mo re schooling than boys. Third, rura l poin ts 
tend to be fa rther from the 45° line, and so male-
female schooling gaps tend to be la rgest in rura l 
a reas. Fourth , the re is a very high correla tion 
in educationa l outcomes across demographic 
groups. Countries with high boys' enrollment 
ra tes a lso tend to have high girls' enrollment 
ra tes. Countries with high urban ed ucation ra tes 
have high rural rates as well. Finally, there is 
considerable heterogeneity across countries in 
schooling atta inment levels, and so it is unlikely 
that the same stra tegy to ra ise enrollments wo uld 
work in a ll countries. Some have yet to get a 
majority of children to complete grade I while 
others a re approaching universal completio n o f 
grade 9, a t least in their urban areas. 
Figures 4.4a and 4.44b repeat the exercise, 
except that the points are combinations of urban 
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and rural schooling attainment levels for males 
and females separately. Almost all combinations 
lie below the 45° line, indicating that urban resi-
dents get more schooling than rura l residents. 
The degree of schooling inequality between 
urban and rural children, as indicated by the 
distance from the 45° line, increases with school-
ing level. Only 8 percent of urban males failed 
to complete grade I, compared to 22 percent of 
rural male; 16 percent of urban males and 37 
percent of rural males failed to complete grade 
5, the gaps that must be filled to atta in UPE. For 
both urban and rural males, there is a sharp drop 
off in attainment after grade 5. ln only 60 per-
cent of countries do a majority of male children 
complete grade 9, and only rarely do rural males 
reach that level. 
Schooling levels are even lower for females. 
As shown in figure 4.4b, a lmost all combina-
tions lie below the 45° hne, indicating that 
urban females almost always get more schooling 
than their rural counterparts. A large advan-
tage for urban females opens up immediately 
upon school entry. Just over two-thirds of rural 
females complete one year of schooling, but 
only 54 percent manage to complete grade 5. 
Of urban females, 86 percent complete at least 
one year of schooling and 77 percent complete 
grade 5. The UPE goal has not yet been satis-
fied for about one-quarter of urban girls and 
one-half of rural girls in developing countries. 
Consequently, while problems are not the same 
across countries, a significant proportion of 
developing countries have yet to atta in the UPE 
goal. 
Where and How can Schooling be 
Increased most Efficiently? 
Given the substantial gap from UPE, our task 
is to identify where schooling atta inment can 
be expanded most efficiently. ln table 4.2, we 
present the stylized facts rega rding the popula-
tion of youth aged 15 19 that failed to complete 
grade 5 by region of the world. All youth in this 
age range should have been able to complete 
grade 5. We decompose the population failing 
to complete grade 5 into two groups, those who 
never went to schoo l and those who dropped out 
before completing grade 5. Our estimate of those 
who never went to school is given by the fraction 
of 14-year-olds who never attended. We present 
the data by population-weighted averages of 
geographic regions. 
Our contention is that it is less expensive to 
get the children who have dropped out to com-
plete the primary cycle than it is to get children 
who never attended school to attain literacy. 
We know that for children who at least started 
school, there exists school capacity that induced 
parents to send the child to school. ln addition, 
these parents at least cared enough about their 
children's schooling to make an initial invest-
ment of child time. It is more difficult to induce 
parents who have not sent their children to 
school to enroll the child for the first time and 
to take the child through the primary cycle. The 
reason we focus on completing at least five grades 
is the result from figure 4.2 that five grades a re 
sufficient to attain literacy. Investments that do 
not successfully carry the child through grade 5 
arc likely to be wasted. 
The fraction of children not completing grade 
5 varies from very small proportions in China 
and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to over 
40 percent of children in Africa. Worldwide, 
excluding China and the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asian countries, 30 percent of children 
in developing countries fail to complete grade 5. 
Of these, 55 percent started school but dropped 
out. To put these proportions into perspective, 
about 112 million children were born in devel-
oping countries in 2004. Assuming that current 
patterns do not change between 2004 and 2015, 
we estimate that 26 million of these children 
will fail to complete grade 5. Of these, 14.4 
million will start school and drop out before 
attaining literacy and numeracy. 12 Those 14.4 
million represent the most cost-effective target 
for raising literacy rates in the world. If these 
14.4 million children were able to complete 
12 Our fraction of children not completing grade 5 is rea-
sonably close to the U ESCO estimate of the fraction of 
children who a rc illiterate. 
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Table 4.2. Percentage of youth 15-19 years old not completing grade 5 and of 14 years old never starting 
school, by world region 
Eastern Middle I 
Africa Asia Europe latm America East l 
S 1 East- West- East- South Chrna Central Central South North 
amp e South Middle Pacifrce Jlsfa .. · Africa , 
(15) 
All childr.:n 
Not completing" 40.9'" . 
Never ~tart ing 14.4''ru 
DropoutJ :!6.5"•., 
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Not completmgl' 39.9' " 
Ne~er starting· I :!.5" . 
Dropout·' 27.4% 
F.:mal.:s 
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DropoutJ 
Urban 
!\ot completingh 
Never starting 
DropoutJ 
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Source: Authors' compilation of data CQmpilcd by Deon hlmcr from the most n.-ccntl~ availahle household sur,cys conducted m 
each of the eighty-'>i< de'dl>ping countril'> bet\\ecn 1994 and 2005, M'M'M',M'orldiHmA.orglrewanhlprojeclfll'datraittl. 
• Population-~barc "cightcd averages of countne~ in the region. Number of countries mdudcd 111 the regional average is rn brackets. 
• The '>hare of 15 19-year-old' "ho did not complete grade 5. 
<The 'hare of 14-ycar-old~ "ho nc\cr attended school. 
' The ;hare of 14-ycar-old' \\ho nc\cr attended school. 
J Estimated share of 15 19-car-old\ "ho >tartcd ...:hool but dropJl<.-d out before complctrn!! grade 5. 
' bcluding China 
the primary cycle, the gap from U PE in these 
countries would decrease from 23 percent to 10 
percent. 
The other statistics in table 4.2 demon-
strate that for almost all demographic groups, 
substantial progress toward UPE can be made 
by reducing dro pouts. Aggregating across coun· 
tries, 61 percent o f males and 49 percent of 
females who failed to complete grade 5 did so 
because they dropped out. The correspondmg 
ratios for urban and rura l residents are 62 per· 
cent and 55 percent, respectively. We also shO\\ 
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infonnation on child ren in the lowest two quin-
ules of the income distribution. 
We can also show the importance of house-
hold income as a factor infl uencing child school-
ing attainment. The bottom of table 4.2 includes 
the school entry, completion, and dropout rates 
for children living in households in the poorest 
two income qui ntiles. Children in the poorest 
households fail to com plete grade 5 in higher 
proportions in every part of the world: 37 per-
cent of the poorest children fa il to complete 
grade 5, compared to 23 percent overall. Of 
these, 54 percent dropped out after sta rting 
school. For all these groups, therefore, reduc-
ing the incentives to drop out would generate 
substantial progress to\\-ard UPE for all demo-
graphic groups in all regions of the developing 
world. 
Supply-Side Interventions 
There are two avenues through which govern-
ments can influence parental schooling choices. 
Supply-side policies a1m to improve the quan-
tity or quality of schooling offered. These 
policies include direct provision of newly con-
structed schools or of school supplies by the 
central government, but they can also involve 
the decentra lization of school control to local 
authorities who are behcved to be able to allo-
cate resources more efficiently to meet school 
needs. Demand-side policies attempt to directly 
in fl uence parenta l incentives to allocate more 
of their children's time to school. We will argue 
tha t demand-side policies show more promise 
for cost-effective means of enhancing schooling 
outcomes, but we will fi rst explain why we view 
supply-side mechanisms as less promising. 
If you Build it, they May not Come 
The biggest concern with new school construc-
tion is that most of the costs of new build-
ing and staffing are incurred before we find 
out if parents will send their children to the 
school. Dufto's (2001) analysis of Indonesia's 
massive public works project that doubled the 
number of primary schools in a six-year period 
resulted in a statist ically significant but sma ll 
3 percent increase in average years of school-
ing. Similarly, Filmer's (2004) analysis of the 
relationship between distance and enrollments 
across twenty-one developing countries gener-
ally found very small marginal effects of lower-
ing distance. Enrollment does not appear to be 
highly sensitive to the distance to the nearest 
school. This does not imply that school provi-
sion is unimportant only that the existing 
supply is already located in the most dense 
child populations. New schools will be dispro-
port ionately located in relatively remote places 
where there arc relatively few children to add 
to the rolls and relatively high costs of adding 
capacity. 
Frequently forgotten in the analysis of new 
school construction projects is that they may 
cause some students currently going to private 
schools to switch to the new public schools. This 
is particularly true in urban areas of develop-
ing countries where private schools are more 
plentiful. As public school supply is expanded, 
some private school students are likely to switch 
to public schools and some private schools will 
close, diminishing the benefi ts of the supply 
expansion.13 In rural areas, where private 
schools are frequently non-existent, there is no 
such crowding out effect of government school 
expansion. 
Quality Matters, but we don 't know how to 
Foster Quality 
It is undoubtedly true that higher-quality 
schools enhance human capita l production 
and raise the demand for education. However, 
research has fa iled to identify how to foster 
improved quality. For example, Rivkin el a/. 
(2005) found that good teachers systematically 
produce better academic outcomes than do bad 
teachers. Unfortunately, good teachers and bad 
teachers look very much alike statistically they 
have the same education levels, similar demo-
graphics, receive the same in-service training 
11 See Jimenc7 and Sawada (200 I). 
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and are compensated similarly. In other words, 
teacher quality matters, but we don't know what 
matters for teacher quality. As teachers repre-
sent 74 percent of recurring school expenditures 
in developing countries (Bruns et a/. 2003), it 
would seem that any policy aimed at improving 
school quality would have to confront teacher 
quality. The lack of agreement about how to 
foster teacher quality thwarts any general pre-
scription regarding likely cost-effective avenues 
for improvement. 
There have been many studies of the educa-
tional production process, with very inconsist-
ent findings. Teacher or school attributes that 
appear critically important for student perform-
ance in one study prove unimportant or even 
detrimental in another. Experimental designs 
don't really resolve the problem because the 
value of one type of input (textbooks, say) 
may depend on what other assets the school 
has available (trained teachers, English-medium 
instruction). A particular experimental infusion 
of inputs may succeed in some settings and not 
others, complicating the applicability of the les-
sons to other schools and settings. As an exam-
ple, Glewwe et a/. (2009) found that making 
textbooks more available in Kenya benefited 
students in the upper tail of the abil ity distribu-
tion, who were prepared for the English-medium 
texts, but the texts had no impact on average and 
below-average students, most of whom could 
not read those textbooks. 
Chaudhury eta/. (2006) report that, in devel-
oping countries, teachers are absent about 20 
percent of the time. Such absenteeism rates have 
a tremendous impact on the education sector. In 
terms of direct loss of financing, it is estimated 
that between I 0 and 24 percent of recurrent 
primary education expenditures are currently 
lost to teacher absenteeism. Losses from teacher 
absenteeism range from $16 million per year in 
Ecuador to $2 billion per year in India (Patrinos 
and Kagia 2007). Many of the absences are 
perfectly legal as schools offer numerous ben-
14 EDUCOcomes from the Spanish acronym "Educacion 
con Participac10n de Ia Comun idad," or ··community 
Managed Schools." 
efits for teachers, including many days of ~id 
leave and annual leave. One might gue:.~ ·hat 
simply removing these legal absences would help 
resolve the problem, except that comparison) of 
spot-check attendances with official attend" net 
registries indicates that off-contract absen~.-es 
are rarely reported. Duflo and Hanna (2005) 
report on the effect of placing cameras with 
time indicators into remotely sited schools in 
India. Compared to schools without cameras, 
teacher attendance rises substantially. When 
teachers attend more regularly, their students 
attend more regula rly as well, and the studcnts 
appear to perform better on standardized t~t . 
This experiment holds promise as a means of 
reducing shirking by teachers in a cost-effectl\e 
manner, but we do not yet have enough mfor-
mation in other settings to know if these re~ults 
generalize. 
It is undoubtedly true that higher-qualit) 
schools enhance human capital production and 
raise school demand. However, our lack of cle; r 
rules of thumb regarding how to improve sch• I 
quality suggest that we arc not yet prepared to 
make general propositions regarding likely co~t­
effective avenues for improvement. 
Are Better Managed Schools Better, or are 
Better Schools Better Managed? 
International agencies have made decentraliza-
tion of school management a central theme of 
new efforts to improve the efficiency of public 
service delivery in developing countries (Bard han 
2005). The clear attraction of the strategy is that 
it offers the potential of improving school out-
comes without spending more on the schoob 
- we simply "spend smarter and not harder ' 
to modify the common aphorism. The available 
evidence, even that often used by proponenb 
of decentralization, is really too uncertain to 
provide a high degree of confidence that !01.-al 
management can work in all settings, without 
complementa ry investments. Studies by Jimena 
and Sawada ( 1999) of the EDUC014 schools 111 
El Salvador and by King and Ozier (2001) of 
the autonomous schools in Nicaragua found 
that schools that exercised more local autonom~ 
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e\perienced gains in student attendance or test 
-.cores compared to other schools. However, 
participating schools are not randomly drawn 
local authorities had to self-select into the 
programs and would be dropped if they did 
not fulfill their obligations. It is likely that the 
schools opting to accept local responsibility 
differ in ways that could vary school outcomes 
compared to communities that did not elect to 
participate in the program. In other words, a 
finding that autonomous schools outperform 
-.chools that are not autonomous does not imply 
that the non-autonomous schools would have 
had better outcomes if they, too, had become 
autonomous. 
More recent papers continue to find that 
autonomous schools differ in important ways 
from those that do not exercise such author-
ity. Gertler et a/. (2006) find that Mexico's 
rural school-based management intervention 
resulted in a small but statistically significant 
reduction in repetition and failure rates for 
schools in poor areas. Galiani et a/. (2005) 
found that early adopters of a school manage-
ment program in Argentina experienced the 
largest improvements in schooling outcomes. 
Again. the sorting of schools into autonomous 
and non-autonomous groups is not random. 
In Mexico, schools choose to participate in the 
program. In Argentina, the early adopters were 
the wealthiest schools. 
Even if decentralization were known to raise 
schooling outcomes U!:>ing the same inputs, it 
is not clear how governments can best foster 
decentralization. Gunnarsson eta/. (2007) found 
that most of the variation in the practice of local 
school autonomy occurs \\-ithin and not between 
countries, suggesting that national policies to 
foster decentralized decision-making may have 
litt le elfect on actual school autonomy. 
We may eventually have a better grasp of how 
to foster local school management and how to 
generate the skills needed to manage schools in 
areas that do not already have those skills. At 
the current level of knowledge, it is premature 
to make a general recommendation that local 
school management will improve schooling out-
comes. 
Returns to Increased School Supply Come 
after a Long Lag 
Supply-side interventions generally require the 
allocation of funds upfront with the hoped-for 
child or parental response becoming apparent 
only later. Once built, there is no economic 
return to a new school unless children enroll, but 
it may be fi ve years before children attain per-
manent literacy. It may take some time for par-
ents to perceive school quality improvements. 
Similarly, it may take some time for teachers 
and students to respond to better local school 
management. Perhaps even more important is 
that the returns to the parents will come in the 
form of increased child earnings that a re far 
into the future and heavily discounted relative 
to the immediate direct and opportunity costs 
parents face in sending their children to school. 
The combination of upfront costs, uncertain 
response, and delayed benefits place supply-
side interventions at a cost-benefit disadvantage 
compared to the demand-side alternatives dis-
cussed in the next section. 
When conducting benefit-cost comparisons, 
efforts to shift the demand for schooling have 
some distinct advantages over efforts to influ-
ence supply. A demand-side stimulus can be 
targeted to the particular population currently 
not in school, whereas supply-side interven-
tions will generally involve some redistribu-
tion of children who are already in school to 
new schools. Demand-side interventions can be 
made contingent on the child being in school, 
meaning that payment occurs only if the pro-
gram is working. In contrast, as we have just 
seen, supply-side interventions generally require 
the allocation of funds upfront with the hoped-
for child or parental response becoming appar-
ent only later. Demand-side interventions have 
benefits to the household that are discounted 
less heavily because they can put money in the 
parents' pockets immediately. either by lowering 
schooling costs or providing transfer payments 
in exchange for the child being in school. The 
parents also see the benefits immediately rather 
than the less apparent return in the form of 
future income the child will earn as an adult. 
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Finally, from the societal perspective, demand-
side interventions can influence behavior imme-
diately and so have an advantage relative to the 
more heavily discounted benefits of supply-side 
interventions, at least in terms of increasing 
enrollment. Even so, some supply-side interven-
tions may be justified by their impact on learning 
outcomes and by equity considerations, even 
though they could not yet be justified under 
strict comparisons of benefits against costs. 
Adding schools to rural areas is expensive, and 
there may be insufficient numbers of students 
to take advantage of the returns to scale needed 
to make the school cost-effective, even with 
100 percent enrollment. Similarly, some reforms 
may be needed to shift the incentives for teachers 
or the aspi rations of students, even if the reforms 
take hold only over a long time horizon. 
Demand-Side Interventions 
This section reviews three types of interven-
tions: Interventions in child health or nutrition 
that attempt to improve the child's physical 
or mental ability to learn; efforts to lower the 
cost of public or private schooling that enhance 
households' ability to pay for schooling; and 
income transfers to households that are made 
conditional on the child's enrollment, which wi ll 
make schooling more affordable and lower the 
opportunity cost of children's time in school. 
Demand-side interventions will be most effec-
tive in settings with high income and price elastici-
ties of demand for schooling and where the supply 
of schooling is also very elastic with respect to 
household wi llingness-to-pay (WTP) for school-
ing. Since stimulating demand in settings where 
t\ There have been several reviews of early childhood 
interventions that combine schooling and nutrition in 
developed countries. Reviews by Currie (200 I), Carneiro 
and Heckman (2003), and Heckman and Ma~terove 
(2007) conclude that the benefits of these programs fre-
quently exceed their costs and that the programs dominate 
interventions that occur later in life. Recipients of early 
childhood training arc less likely to drop out of school or 
engage in criminal activities. Recipients of school break-
fa~! programs have healthier die ts (Bhattacharya et at. 
2006) that can raise their cognitive development. 
additional school space cannot accommodate 
more students wi ll have little impact, demand-
side strategies work best where there is ex 
capacity in existing schools, which allo\\~ more 
children to be added at a low marginal co~t. 
Health and Schooling 
There is a high incidence of malnutritton in 
developing countries. UNICEF compilations 
indicate that 28 percent of children in de e~ 
oping countries are moderately or se\en:l} 
under-nourished. In areas where malnutnuc liS 
common, nutritional supplements and/or treat· 
ments for intestinal diseases or parasites offer an 
inexpensive way to raise school attendance and 
physical and mental capacity. 
Numerous policies aimed at improving child 
health have been administered to children cur-
rently in school, including the distribution of 
nutrition supplements, provision of school 
lunches, school-based immunization programs, 
and delivery of health education for studen· 
Programs have also been implemented 
improve the health of infants and pre-school-age 
children, and these programs are the ones t~ t 
have been most ngorously evaluated. 
There is substantial evidence that malnutri-
tion early in life compromises both cogmtl\e 
and physical development in a way that rna} be 
difficult to reverse through better nutrition later 
in life. For example, Glewwe eta/. (2001) found 
that controlling for other household background 
measures, children who were malnourished earl~ 
in life start school later, complete fewer year~ of 
schooling, and learn less per year of schooling. 
Alderman et a/. (2003) report similar findinf 
for children who were malnourished because of 
exposure to civil war and drought in Zimbabwe. 
Evaluations of efforts to provide nutrition..! 
supplements to at-risk pre-school children m 
developed countries have shown permanent 
improvements in physical stature and cogniti\e 
development, both of which can raise lifetime 
earnings. 15 
Behrman et a/. (2004) conducted an expen-
mental evaluation of the Proyecto Integral de 
Desarrollo lnfantil (PJDJ) program in Boli\ia. 
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This program provides day care, nutritional 
inputs, and pre-school activities for low-income 
children aged 6-72 months. For children exposed 
to the program for periods exceeding one year, 
the authors report permanent gains in cognitive 
development and fine motor skills. Grantham-
McGregor et a/. ( 199 1) report comparable fi nd-
ings for a similar program aimed at stunted 
infants in Jamaica, as do Armecin eta/. (2005) for 
low-income rural households in the Philippines. 
Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) found that pro-
\iding free breakfast to pre-schoolers raised 
attendance by 30 percent in Kenya, but did not 
raise average measured sk1lls. An analysis of a 
program that combined de-worming medication 
1\'ith an iron supplement for pre-schoolers in 
India also raised attendance and physical stature 
(Bobonis era/. 2004). 
Health programs have been shown to raise 
schooling investments for young school-aged 
children as well. Afridi (2007a, 2007b) found 
that a school lunch program in India increased 
attendance of girls but not of boys, but did lower 
the incidence of malnutrition for both boys and 
girls. This program costs just pennies per day. In 
a widely cited study, Miguel and Kremer (2004) 
examined the impact of a program that admin-
istered de-worming medicine to school children 
in Kenya. The treated children increased their 
attendance by 0.15 years per pupil, at an implicit 
cost of only $3.50 per child per year of schooling. 
utritional programs can even have ben-
efits at older ages. McGuire (1996) reports that 
giving iron supplements to secondary school-age 
children ( 13 15 years) in a low-income country 
can raise cognitive abilities by 5- 25 percent or 
the equi valent of 0.5 years of schooling. Brown 
et a/. (2006) found that the provision of iron 
supplements and treatments for intestinal para-
sites to adult apparel factory workers in India 
improved productivity. Even for these teenage 
or older recipients, nutritional supplements are 
inexpensive and can generate benefits well in 
excess of costs. 
One reason these health interventions can be 
\iewed as particularly cost-effective in raising 
schooling investments is that the schooling is a 
collateral benefit. The main aim for most of these 
programs is to improve child health, which is va l-
uable in itself, and so raises the benefits side of the 
equation. On the cost side, expenses are incurred 
only if the children participate and so there is 
much less potential for wasted investments than 
is the case for supply-side interventions. 
How generalizable are these studies to other 
developing country sett ings? Miguel and Kremer 
(2004) a rgue that the potential impact of de-
worming on school attendance could be very 
large if expanded worldwide, in that 25 percent 
of children in developing countries are infected. 
However, it is useful to keep in mind that the 
impact is in raising the attendance of children 
already in school and not necessarily inducing 
children not in school to enroll. Secondly, their 
population of students had an infection rate of 
92 percent and so the magni tude of the impact is 
likely related to fact that they selected sites most 
in need of the intervention areas with more 
modest infection rates would have sma ller pro-
gram impacts. Demographic and health survey 
data suggest that health reasons are less often 
cited as a reason for children not being in school 
than are child work inside or outside the home, 
poverty, or lack of interest on the part of the 
child (table 4.3). Health is cited more often in 
Africa and in urban areas of Latin America, but 
is less often cited elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, nutrition and health programs 
for pre-school age as well as school-age children 
will have particular relevance for the poorest 
households, who have a disproportionate share 
of the children who drop out before completing 
five grades. Many of these programs are rela-
tively inexpensive to deliver. Most importantly, 
the benefits they offer from improved health 
alone may be much larger than the expense, even 
if they have little impact on schooling. 
Lowering Schooling Costs 
In many developing countries, parents face user 
fees for access to basic social services such 
as health care, sanitation, potable water, or 
schooling. These fees may discourage service uti-
liza tion by the most vulnerable children: Girls, 
the poor, the rural, the disabled, and minority 
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Table 4.3. Reasons for not attending school in urban and rural populations, by world region 
regtons SSA Middle East & Europe Asia & caribbe 
All world North Afnca & Cdtiiii.Asia South & East Latin Amei 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Ur~Ej.Rural ~ ~
Work out>ide the home 7.4 .u 3.3 1.8 0.7 0.7 9.3 7.8 8.7 4.4 I!U 10.0 
llou'e'' ark 7.3 11.5 5.3 7.9 5.6 9.9 6.1 9.3 10.7 19.7 11.7 17 9 
Inadequate school supply 1.9 4.9 1.8 3.2 2.0 6.2 u 3.0 1.7 2.7 2.6 10. 
PO\Crty I!C! 18.1 24.1 23.9 4.6 3.4 u 0.8 24.2 26.3 II 9 II.' 
Lad. of intere•t 47.3 44.0 45.2 42.7 76.6 69.4 65.0 5lU 49.3 41.7 ~4 0 33 5 
llcalth reasons 6.3 5.0 7.9 7.6 1.2 0.5 o.- 0.4 1.5 0.9 9.4 4 2 
Others 11.5 12.3 12.4 12.9 9.3 9.9 16.0 20.5 4.0 4.3 12.1 12 3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Suuro:: Computation; flr<l\ tdcd to the author by El11abeth Kmg based on data from D~mo~;r.tphic 00. 
Table 4.4. Percentage of developing countries charging primary school fees, by world region, 2005 
~ Latin Mtddle East .J 
Africa East Asia South Asia Eura~ America North Afnca Totl!!] 
Tuition fees 26"'• 25'% O'X, 20% 31% 40%. 25 
Textbooks 17% 41°/ (Y•/41 :!0'~1o 31 % IO''ro 25 
Lmforms 32% 41" 25" lO Y. 63% 20% 35 
Parent Teacher Associations 67% 91 50'' 90".ro 73% 60% 69 
and Community Fees 
Other 35% 58 'ro 37% 40'}0 J6'i"o 30". 36 
Ollicial fees 65% 75'''• 50'/'o 90% 63% 80"·· 
Unofficial fees 32'Yo 58' X, 38% 30% 42'}:, 40% 
An) fcc 82"/., 92°1u 63% 100% 79% 90"/,, 
Source: Author's compilation or data reported in Katlan (2006), ann~' l Origmal data t.tkcn from World Ban~ ;urvc)' conducted m 
2005 m ninety-three de\elopmg countri~. 
ethnic or racial groups. If widespread, such 
user fees could be a significant barrier to the 
achievement of universal basic education and 
health care . 
Primary School Fees are Commonly Charged in 
Developing Countries 
In 2005, the World Bank commissioned a survey 
of primary school fees in developing ninety-
three countries (Kattan 2006). The findings 
show a strong trend toward reducing the price 
of attending primary school in developing coun-
tries. Whereas only three countries offered free 
primary schools before 2000, sixteen had elimi-
nated all school fees by 2005. The reduction or 
elimination of universa l fees for primary school-
ing has been pa rticularly noticeable in Africa. 
where countries such as Cameroon, Ghana. 
Kenya, Lesotho, Tanzania, and Uganda ha\ e 
all reduced or eliminated fees since 2000. In fact. 
one could conclude that primary school fees do 
not represent a problem in that only 18 percent 
of the ninety-three developing countries offi-
cially charge tuition for primary schools. 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of parents m 
developing countries still face private costs of 
sending their children to primary school. and 
these costs are often large relative to measure~ 
of household ability to pay. Even when go\· 
ernment policy prohibits tuition, fees rna} be 
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charged informally. Informal tuition is charged 
m 7 percent of the countries, raising the per-
centage charging primary school tuition to 25 
percent. Even more important, as shown in table 
4.4, countries charge a variety of fees associated 
with primary schooling, even when there is no 
tuition. Of the sixty-nine countries that have 
free primary school tuition, only sixteen actually 
offer free access to primary schools. The rest of 
the countries charge alternate fees for textbooks, 
uniforms, school support, or other mandated 
payments for accessing the school. 
The most common of these is a fee charged 
by a Parent Teacher Association or other com-
munity associa tion that supports the school. 
While these fees may be voluntarily paid by 
households, failure to pay can lead to expul-
sion in other places. In addition, these fees tend 
to increase as tuition or other explicit fees are 
reduced . They are charged m 30 percent of the 
countries despite official policies stipulating tha t 
such fees should not be charged. 
In at least one-quarter of the countries, par-
ents are charged for textbooks. Over one-third of 
the countries charge for uniforms and for other 
fees associated with school activities. Overall, 63 
percent of the developing countries have official 
policies to charge at least one of the five types of 
primary school fees considered. Fees are charged 
informally for at least one of the five fees in 35 
percent of the countries. In total, parents in 84 
percent of the developing countries have to pay 
either formal or informal fees to send their chil-
dren to primary school. These fees are required 
in virtually all parts of the world including the 
two most populous, India and China. They are 
commonly charged in the poorest countries in 
the world: 82 percent of the countries in Africa, 
63 percent of the South Asian countries, 79 
percent of the Latin American countries, and 92 
percent of the countries in East Asia. If these fees 
retard investments in primary ed ucation, then 
their impact is truly worldwide. 
These fees can represent a significant burden 
to parents, particularly for the poorest house-
holds. Across thirty-four countries for which 
fee information was available, primary school 
fees represented over I 0 percent of average 
household expenditures in six and between 5- 10 
percent in another six. The burden is greatest on 
the poor: A study by Oxfam (2001) found that 
the poorest two household income quintiles in 
developing countries average over I 0 percent of 
their incomes on primary school ing. A study of 
household expenditure patterns in Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Uganda, and Zambia found that only 
food (and, in one case, clothing) takes a greater 
share of household expenditures in those poor 
countries (Boyle eta/. 2002). 
School Fees Adversely Affect Enrollments of 
Disadvantaged Groups 
School fees will have an atypica lly large impact 
on enrollments of children that are particularly 
price-sensitive. Orazem and King (2008) argued 
that the most price-sensitive groups are likely to 
be rural residents, girls, and the poor. If true, 
programs that uniformly reduce the price of 
primary schooling for all children will dispro-
portionately increase enrollments of girls, rural 
children, and the poor, the very groups that have 
been shown to lag in our educat ion measure in 
table 4.2 and in figures 4.3 and 4.4. Kattan's 
(2006) review oft he empirical record found large 
increases in enrollment in the countries that 
eliminated primary school fees. In the sub-set 
of countries where more detailed analysis was 
available, the most rapid increases in enroll-
ments have been for poor, female, and rural 
children. Additionally, general fee red uctions 
in Kenya, Lesotho, and Tanzania led to rising 
enrollments for orphans and children of parents 
with HIV/AIDS. 
These findings of large enrollment responses 
to school fee reductions hold up in more careful 
evaluations that control for competing expla-
nations. A rigorous evaluation is available of 
a program in Bogota, Colombia which was 
launched in 2004. The user fee reduction pro-
gram, known as Gratuidad, was well ta rgeted, 
using a proxy-mean index, such that the prob-
ability that households benefit from the fee 
red uction is a discontinuous function of their 
score. This fact allowed Barrera-Osorio et a/. 
(2007) to implement a regression discontinuity 
design to estimate the program's effect. The 
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results suggest that the program had a signifi-
cant impact: The fee reductions offered to stu-
dents from the poorest families had a positive 
effect on enrollment in primary and secondary 
schooling. The estimates suggest that the pro-
gram raises the probability of enrollment for 
primary-aged students by about 3 percent and 
for secondary school-aged students by about 6 
percent. These positive effects seem to be larger 
for at-risk students, and not to vary by gender. 
Fafchamps and Min ten (2007) took advantage 
of a unique political crisis to observe how par-
ents respond to schooling costs. In Madagascar, 
supporters of a defeated presidential candidate 
imposed a blockade of the central highlands of 
Madagascar that disrupted the delivery of all 
public services, including education. Enrollment 
in rural primary schools was found to withstand 
the effect of the crisis. After the blockade was 
broken, the government suspended user fees 
for public services including school fees to help 
the communities recover from the economic 
consequences of the blockade. The fee suspen-
sions were not applied immediately in all rural 
communes, and so the authors could compare 
enrollment changes in areas with and without 
user fees. They found that suspension of user 
fees resulted in significant increases in school 
enrollment. 
Evaluations have found substantial increases 
in enrollment even from modest reductions in 
the costs parents face from sending their children 
to school. A program that cut household costs 
of uniforms and school materials in Kenya, at 
a cost of about $15 per child, increased years 
of schooling completed by 15 percent (Kremer 
et a/. 2003). This is an important result in that 
it may not be necessary to eliminate all types 
of fees to get the desired behavioral response in 
terms of child time in school. Even places that 
eliminated fees officially often still have informal 
fees to help support school functions. 
A case in point is the best-known and most-
studied case of school user fee removal: That 
of Uganda, which removed user fees in 1997 
as part of the effort to achieve UPE. Note that 
in Uganda, fees are still charged legally for 
textbooks, uniforms, and other school func-
tions. Nevertheless, Deininger (2003) found that 
elimination of primary school tuition lowered 
costs by 60 percent on average, or by about $16 
per child. As a result, enrollments increased by 
60 percent. Consistent with the presumption 
of larger price elasticities in rural areas, rural 
enrollments more than doubled while urban 
enrollments rose by only 16 percent. Using 
regression discontinuity and difference-in-
difference estimation techniques, Grogan {2006) 
and Nishimura et al (2008) found that the 
reduction in fees led to a reduction in delayed 
enrollments. The Nishimura eta/. analysis con-
cluded that grade completion rates up to grade 
5 rose, with especially large effects among girls 
from poor households. 
These very large responses to school price 
reductions are the best argument for demand-
side efforts to improve literacy. The contrast 
with the very small increase in schooling that 
resulted from the doubling of the number of 
schools in Indonesia reported by Duflo (2001) 
is striking. For cost-benefi t comparisons, we 
find that relatively low-cost fee reductions result 
in much large behavioral responses than has 
been obtained from supply-side interven tions. 
Nevertheless, there is a significant concern that 
these large enrollment increases can over-tax the 
ability of the country to provide a productive 
school environment. 
Reduction in User Fees Threatens School 
Quality 
The Uganda case also points out a poten tial 
problem with reliance on user-fee reduction 
or elimination to attain UPE. The resulting 
enrollment expansion in Uganda came at the 
cost of considerable over-crowding, as school 
supplies did not keep up. Pupil- teacher ratios 
rose from 48: I to 70: I in rural areas and from 
38: I to 65: I overall. Similarly, in the India 
school meal program, Afridi (2007a) reports 
that pupil teacher ratios were higher in par-
ticipating classrooms because supply did not 
keep up with demand. This trade off between 
increased schooling demand and reductions in 
the quality of schooling appears to be a general 
characteristic of programs aimed at reducing 
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user fees. Tiongson 's (2005) review of twenty 
studies across ten countries found that, in all 
cases, enrollments rose. But, in the fifteen stud-
ies that considered the issue, measures of school 
quality fell in every case but one. 
The loss in quality is not surprising fees 
paid by parents can be a high fraction of the 
total financial support for a school. Private fees 
account for over half the resources available to 
primary schools in Cambodia, and for over half 
the revenues available to the schools in Uganda 
and Zambia before the elimination of fees; even 
after the elimination of legal school fees, infor-
mal fees still account for 80 percent of school 
expenditures in Malawi . In developing countries 
where the taxing authority is weak, charging 
fee for services rendered may be the only way 
for public agencies to recover costs. It is not 
surprising that the elimination o r reduction of 
those fees creates a strain o n service delivery 
and quality. 
l t is not clear how damaging this over-
crowding is to student learmng, but presumably 
chi ldren who were already in school may be 
negatively affected when thc!>c programs raise 
the number of students per teacher. Again, 
the Uganda case provides careful s tudies that 
address this issue. The Grogan (2006) study 
found that, following the fee reduction, there 
was a I 0 percent fall in the probability that a 
publicly schooled child of a given age and socio-
economic characteristics was able to complete 
a simple reading test contained in the 2001 
Demographic and H ealth Survey Education 
Supplement. The Nishimura et a/. (2008) study 
also found evidence of increased inefficiency: 
An increased likelihood tha t children who start 
school will drop out before completion. 
We should emphasize that any program that 
increases enrollments atypically for the most 
disadvantaged groups would a lmost certainly 
result in a reduction in average measures of aca-
demic success. That is because the population of 
children in school will be weighted more heavily 
toward groups who would be expected to have 
more difficulty in school. The better measure of 
the net gain vs. loss from the program is whether 
the cognitive gains from increased enrollments 
o utweigh the losses attributable to over-crowd-
ing and reduced schoo l quality. In the case of 
Uganda, it seems that the gains clearly outweigh 
the losses. A back-of-the-envelope computation 
suggests that even with a I 0 percent increase in 
academic failure conditional on having entered 
school , the 60 percent increase in enrollments 
suggests that the fraction of children attaining 
literacy increased by 44 percent. 
Ways to Reduce User Fees without Sacrificing 
School Q ua lity 
It is too simplistic to argue that cost reductions 
would be imposed only where there is excess 
school capacity and so we can avoid the added 
costs of hiring more teachers and building more 
schools. While we have demonstrated that the 
fraction of dropouts is large relative to the total 
number of children fai ling to complete the pri-
mary cycle and so potential capacity exists to 
meet their needs, in practice we know that some 
children will enter school that previously would 
not have enrolled at all. These first-time entrants 
will increase the number of children relative to 
teachers and will eventually necessitate addi-
tional resources in order to maintain quality. 
Some have argued that the only way to reduce 
user fees in schooling is to have a coincident 
commitment to increase public support of the 
schools to replace lost revenues. The strongest 
advocacy for this view comes from the literature 
on user fees in health care. Removal of user fees 
increases usage, especially by the poor. A review 
of twenty-seven studies suggests that this policy 
has been most successful when supported by 
supply-side measures that remove other barriers 
to access (James eta/. 2006). However, there arc 
mechanisms by which demand-side measures 
can still increase utilization without sacrificing 
school resources. 
The most obvious of these is to target the fee 
reduction to the most disadvantaged groups: 
The poor, female, rura l, disabled, or minority 
children who are under-served by the for-fee 
service. These targeted scholarships maintain 
payments from those best able to pay who 
arc already accessing schools while increasing 
enrollments of the most vulnerable. There is 
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considerable experience with local ta rgeting to 
identi fy those most deserving of public transfers 
at relatively low cost (Alderman 200 I; Faguet 
2004; Galasso and Ravallion 2005). Such efforts 
would lower the adverse impact of the demand 
response on school quality for those already in 
school. 
The Private Sector may be Induced to Provide 
Some of the Necessary S upply 
The most promising mechanisms to reduce 
schooling costs without sacrificing quali ty is 
to provide the ta rgeted poor with the resources 
needed to pay for the costs of schooling. These 
vouchers could be used for support of public or 
quasi-public schools through the use of capita-
tion grants, per-pupil payments that are made 
directly to the school. These could be used to 
induce new private suppliers of the service when 
local supply was insufficient. Finally, they could 
be directed to utilize existing excess capacity 
in private schools if the existing public schools 
are over-subscribed. There have been successful 
examples of each of these mechanisms in devel-
oping countries. 
The ava ilability of less expensive teaching 
and infrastructure inputs is a major reason to 
consider private rather than government school 
options to serve the expanding demand for 
schooling. James ( 1993) demonstrated that, 
in many developing countries, private schools 
are an important component of school supply: 
Private schools have excess capacity as meas-
ured by their relatively low numbers of students 
per teacher. In addition, private schools may 
have a lower marginal cost of adding additional 
capacity than government schools. In these cir-
cumstances, modest public subsidies that induce 
private school suppliers to contribute addi-
tional resources may increase enrollments at a 
fraction of the cost of pure public provision of 
schooling. 
One way to accomplish this objective is 
through capitation grants to school operators. 
A program in Balochistan province in Pakistan 
attempted to spur both the demand for school-
ing among girls and to provide an incentive for 
priva te school entry by providing scholarships 
to gi rls. Randomly selected neighborhoods were 
given the option of packaging up to 100 girb' 
scholarships of I 00 rupees per month (equivalent 
to $3) to try to induce a school operator to open 
a school in the area. The scholarship offered 
declined over time, fa lling to zero after four 
years. In urban areas, even this modest substd) 
was sufficient to induce new schools to open 
(Kim eta/. 1999). and enrollments for both gtrb 
and boys rose relative to enrollments in control 
neighborhoods. A similar program in rural areas 
enabled schools to open, but the communities 
were too poor and the number of girls too fey, 
to allow the schools to become self-sustaining 
(Alderman eta/. 2001 ). This raises an important 
lesson for the likely success of private school 
options to raise enrollments- invariably they will 
be most successful in areas that would have been 
able to support private schools in the absence of a 
subsidy: In other words, places with the greatest 
elasticity of supply for private schools. 
In the Balochistan case, the privately man-
aged scholarship schools were opened at one-
quarter of the cost of a public school, in part 
because the schools were able to access proper!) 
at a much lower cost than building a school and 
because the schools were able to hire teachers at 
well below the government pay scale. Despite 
that fact, school quality was sufficiently high 
that students in the newly formed scholarship 
schools outperformed students from similar 
backgrounds in government schools. 
In areas where existing private schools are 
under-subscribed, vouchers may be an excellent 
mechanism by which governments can expand 
access less expensively than by building addi-
tional government schools. One example of 
this strategy was the Colombia PACES pro-
gram that provided subsidies to municipalities 
to provide secondary school vouchers to poor 
children. There was ample evidence that the 
existing government school supply was insuf-
ficient to meet demand and that private schools 
could add additional students without requiring 
additional teachers or classrooms (King et at. 
1999). Vouchers were offered only to children 
in the lowest socioeconomic strata in munici-
palities where private schools had committed to 
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participate. The program cost of$193 (Knowles 
and Behrman 2005) is much higher than the 
cost of the primary school programs discussed 
above. Because the Colombia voucher aimed at 
secondary students, the opportunity cost of the 
children's time is much higher than would be the 
case if they were of primary school age. 
Angrist et a/. (2002, 2006) demonstrated tha t 
children who were randomly sorted into the 
program were I 0 percent more likely to com-
plete grade 8 and also scored 0.2 standard devia-
tions higher on standardized tests. equivalent to 
adding an additional year of school. For those 
in doubt about the external benefits from ed u-
cation, it is interesting that voucher recipients 
also were less likely to marry young or cohabit, 
and were less likely to engage 111 child labor. A 
follow-up analysis confirmed that educationa l 
gains were permanent and not transitory. 
A program in India provides a third mecha-
nism to enable poor households to enroll their 
children in school. In man} developing coun-
tries, students often participate in tutoring after 
school, with the tutoring often provided by the 
same teacher they have in class. Poor children 
ca1mot afford these services and may fa ll behind 
their peers. A program in India hired local 
women with high-school degrees to provide 
remedial tutoring to grade 3 and 4 children who 
had fa llen behind in school (Banerjee et a/. 2007). 
At a cost of $5 per child, the program raised the 
likelihood of a child achieving grade I math level 
by 11 .9 percentage points and grade 2 language 
levels by 9.9 percentage points. By the end of 
the two-year program, children were perform-
ing on average 0.28 standard deviations higher 
on the test scores, roughly equivalent to having 
attained one additional year of schooling. 
The reason the program is so inexpensive is 
that it hired less-qualified tutors at the market 
rate rather than requi ring teaching certifications 
and paying the government rate. These tutors 
{called balsakhis, or children's friends) were paid 
only $10- $15 per month, roughly one-eighth of 
the government schoolteaching rate.16 
Programs to reduce the costs of schooling 
to parents can have dramatic and immediate 
impacts on children's achievement and years of 
schooling completed. Moreover, they can take 
advantage of existing under-u tilized capacity 
in the form of potential teachers and spaces in 
private schools at a fraction of the cost of build-
ing and staffing new schools. Finally, they have 
the add itional advantage that they use resources 
only if the children use the services. 
Conditional Cash Transfers 
Latin American countries have moved rapidly 
to the use of condi tional cash transfers to induce 
pa rents to send their children to school. These 
programs transfer income to a household in 
exchange for it sending their children to school, 
and many include other components, typically 
adding nutrit ional supplements and mandating 
health clinic visits for pre-school children and 
health training for mothers, so that they are not 
aimed solely at education outcomes. Programs 
have been or are being implemented in Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Brazil , Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, and Turkey. 
As with other demand-side interventions, 
these programs will be most e!Tective in envi-
ronments in which schooling demand is highly 
income- and price-elastic and where large num-
bers of children are not in school. These circum-
stances typically prevail in poor communities. 
Indeed, these programs are usually aimed at 
the lowest income strata of society, and con-
siderable attent ion has been paid to identifying 
which households truly deserve the program. 
Some of this effort seems misguided in that the 
poor often face transitory income streams that 
may make them appear poorer in some months 
and better off in others: A transitory nature that 
suggests tha t current income is a poor targeting 
mechanism. In urban areas, it can be costly for 
authorities to try to establ ish which households 
qualify on the basis of income and which do not, 
16 This should probably have been discussed as a supply-
side intervention. e'cept tha t it is virtually indistinguish-
able from the capitation and voucher syslems discussed 
elsewhere. This system could have been designed as a 
voucher lhat would give households the resources to hire 
a tutor. 
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and such efforts lead to moral hazard problems 
in which households may take o n activities that 
lower their earned income but increase their 
chance of getting the government transfer. There 
are significant advantages to using geographic 
targeting in populations where poverty is nearly 
universal, such as poor rural villages. In urban 
areas, targeting on parenta l education may be 
less expensive and is likely to be a better proxy 
for permanent income than is current income. 
ln addition, parents cannot alter or conceal 
school ing as easily as they can alter or conceal 
their income, so the moral hazard problem and 
classification problems a re less severe. 
Conditional transfer programs will be most 
successful when they are aimed at populations 
not currently in school. In Brazil, where indi-
vidual municipalities established their own pro -
grams until they were centralized under the 
federa l Bolsa Familia program, some programs 
targeted children who were so young that the 
vast majority was a lready in school. Allowing 
self-selection into the program permitted fami-
lies whose children would have been in school 
anyway to opt into the program and receive the 
transfer. Perhaps that is why the most careful 
evaluation of the Brazil program (Cardoso and 
Souza 2006) failed to show large benefits. 
The Bangladesh Food for Education pro-
gram transfers a grain ration instead of cash 
to poor households whose children regularly 
attend school. In other respects, this is similar to 
the Latin American programs discussed below. 
Meng and Ryan (2007) found that beneficiaries 
stay in school around one year longer than com-
parable eligible children who did not receive the 
transfer, with a larger effect for girls. 
The most efficient targeting mechanism would 
be to focus on the ages at which school dropout 
occurs. In the least developed countries, the 
target would be children of primary school 
age. In middle-income developing countries, it 
would be more appropriate to target second-
ary school-aged children. lllustrating this point 
is the finding that in more-developed Mexico, 
conditional transfers had a lmost no impact 
on primary school enrollment (Schultz 2004a) 
while in less-developed Nicaragua, there were 
substantia l increases in primary school enroJ-
ment (Maluccio 2006). While most prograllb 
report positive impacts on enrollment, the ga1m 
are slight in some countries and substantial m 
others. For example, the re was little impact m 
Honduras, where most of the targeted childn:n 
were already in school and the transfer was con-
sidered too small to effectively move children 
away from child labor to schooling (Giewwe 
and Olinto 2004). On the other hand, enroll-
ment rose by 23 percentage points in Nicaragua 
during the initial pilot phase, with most of the 
gains in the form of chi ldren exclusively spend· 
ing time in school, rather than combining school 
and work. 
Summarizing across programs, it appears that 
the largest effects from conditional transfer~ 
have been in rural areas and in areas that were 
particularly poor. The most efficient programs 
target transfers to groups that are not already 
in school so that households do not receive 
incentive payments for actions they would have 
undertaken even without the program. 
Benefit-Cost Summary 
Our prima ry task in th is chapter has been to 
identify the low-hanging fruit for raising educa-
tional a ttainment in developing countries: What 
programs will raise educatio n outcomes most 
per dollar spent? We argue that demand-side 
policies dominate supply-side policies because 
it is much less expensive to stimulate schooling 
demand and because the costs a re incurred only 
when ho useho lds fulfi ll the program's objec-
tives. If households do not send their children 
to school, the government does not expend 
resources. 
Estimated benefit-cost ratios for discount 
rates of 3 percent and 6 percent are reported 
in table 4.5. We report the estimates of other 
authors when we assess that they are more care-
fully done than anything we could do from read-
ing the paper, a lthough we make adjustments 
when the authors used other discount ra tes. 
These estimates must be taken with a consider-
able grain of salt. First, while there are reliable 
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Table 4.5. Overview table of B/C ratios from various efforts to reduce Illiteracy 
t~·-· H1ghd1SCOUnt(6%) 
~-l ; Benefit Cost BCR Benefit Cost BCR 
Health and nutrition program' 
Boli\la PI Dl: prc-schovl and $5,107 $1,394 3.7 $2,832 S I ,253 :!.3 
nutntion• 
Ken} a: dcdc-wormingb 22461 3.5! 642 1448! 3.5! 414 
Ken} a: pre-school and nutrition' 2246! $29.13! 77 1448! $28.6! 50.6 
Iron supplcmcms to sccondar) 
'choolcrsJ 
$474! $10.49! 45.2 $289! $10.29! 28.1 
Scholar~h•p/Vouchcr programs 
Pakistan urban girls' scholarship' $3.924! 108! 16.3 $2,530! $118! 21.4 
Paki>tan rural g1rls' scholar,h ip $3,139! $3 11 1 10.1 $2,024! $3261 6.2 
India /Ja/sakhiltutoria1 program1 $7,002! $9.85! 7 11 $4,5 15! $9.76! 463 
t;ganda free primary ~hool 3675! $140! 26.3 2370! $140! 16.9 
program' 
Colombm: PACES !>l.'Condar) $476 S193 2.5 $205 S190 1.1 
school urban voucher-1 
Conditional ca\h transfer:. 
Mexico Progrcssa $17,565! $2585! 6.8 $12,923! $2535! 5.1 
:-;icaragua: RE{)I $5,920! $1574! 3.8 $3,8181 $1574! 2.4 
Sources: Behrman eta/. ( 2004 ). # 
• \1igucl and Kremer (2004).* 
Vermccn.ch and Kremer n<)()5).* 
Kno11lcs and Bchrman(2005). 
'Alderm•m t•tal. (2003).••• 
Banerjee ct ul. (2007). 
Demmgcr (2003) •• 
An gmt <'I a!. (2006). •••• 
Schull/ {1004a). 
Malu~.-.:10 (:!006). 
r-.otes: #Bcnefit-co>t ratio computed 111 the paper 11-ith slight adjustment" for ditTercnces 111 di>count rate 
*Cost per year of o;chooling reporte-d in Abdul Latif Jamccl, Poverty Action Lab. MIT. Cambridge, MA (2005). 
'Per year of schooling mduccd. 
"A>sumcs that the go\cmmcnt expands >chool >pace to accommodate addn1onal student> at the average 
co>t per primary >tudcnt 
... Cost doe. not include \itlue of in kind donation of building. 
•••• E'timate doc• not mdudc the ,-alue of reduced fertility bcha' ior. 
data on the costs of most of these programs, the 
benefits are based on the increase in projected life-
time earnings from the expected impact on years 
of schooling. Our review of returns to literacy 
and to years of schooling demonstrated consid-
erable consistency across countries, genders, and 
urban and rural markets in the estimated returns 
to schooling. In the estimates we report, we 
assume that the return to schooling is an increase 
of 8 percent per year of schooling completed 
over an estimated average earning for labor in 
the country. A modest variation in the returns 
to schooling will not be sufficient to reverse the 
conclusions regarding whether the benefits of 
the interventions outweigh the costs. On the 
other hand, we apply these expected returns to 
interventions that target young children who are 
not yet working, and so we do not have direct 
evidence of the impact of these interventions on 
their wages when they become adults. 
Another reason why our calculations may 
be imprecise is that the returns to increased 
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schooling will depend on labor market and 
schooling factors tha t will differ across countries. 
Returns will depend on the degree o f economic 
freed om in the country - that is, on the ease with 
which human capital can move to its highest 
reward. The magnitude of the schooling increase 
will depend o n how successfully the program 
can be ta rgeted to those popula tions tha t will 
respond most elastically to the in tervention. To 
maximize effectiveness, programs should focus 
on the grade level where dropouts a re most 
prevalent: At the primary level in rura l a reas and 
in urban a reas of the least developed countries, 
and at the secondary level for urban populations 
in middle-income countries. However, there is 
consistent evidence tha t the most productive 
interventions will be early in life beca use: (i) 
the costs of interventions increase with the age 
o f the child; (ii) very early health and school-
ing interventions have been shown to be more 
p roductive than interventions la ter in life; and 
(iii) the earliest interventions have a longer life-
time left in which to recoup the benefi ts o f the 
program. Generalizing across interventions, the 
most responsive populations to these interven-
tions have been poor, rura l, and female: The 
very groups that are currently furthest removed 
from universal primary educatio n. 
Skeptics may a rgue that the children who 
increase their schooling thro ugh these demand-
side initia tives will receive below-average 
returns to that schooling, which will bias our 
benefits upwards. The ra tionale fo r these a rgu-
ments is that adding more educated workers 
will crowd the market and lower wages fo r a ll 
educated workers, and tha t these child ren will 
over-crowd existing schools and lower q ua lity 
for all students. 
Ye t the fi rst of these a rguments seems unlikely 
to hold. Fi rst, even if every d ropout is induced 
to stay in school until grade 5, they will be a 
rela tively small fraction of the litera te work-
fo rce. The o utward shift in the supply o f lite ra te 
workers will be modest. Second, in develo ping 
countries, returns to schooling have tended to be 
11 See Kremer (1993) for an example ofsueh a model and 
Acemoglu (2002) for a review of others. 
la rger at the primary than a t secondary levels 01 
schooling, and so any adverse impact on return~ 
will be starting from a higher base. Third, drop-
outs a re disproportionately from household, 
facing liquid ity constraints, which means the 
returns to schooling are being equated to .1 
higher than market rate of interest. Therefore. 
their current level of schooling is inefficient!} 
low and the return to schooling artificial!} 
higher than the market rate. Fourth, return~ 
to schooling in both developed and developing 
countries have remained remarkably stable over 
time despite very large inc reases in the suppl) 
of educated labor, potentia lly because there 
are externa l productive benefits from increas-
ing fractions of educated workers that raise the 
efficiency of prod uction. 17 Finally, even if the 
a rgument that raising the literacy ra te would 
lower the return to literacy, a policy prescrip-
tion that we keep some predominantly poor 
child ren illi terate so that we can ra ise the returns 
to schooling for literate children fails on almost 
any ethical dimension. 
The second argument, tha t the children who 
are devoting more time to school will be spend-
ing tha t time in bad schools or else will be raising 
pupil- teacher ratios, is a more credible concern. 
If true, then perhaps increased time in school 
will not result in greater literacy. For example, 
the results of cognitive tests for the Kenya de-
worming experiment found tha t even though 
students spent more time in school, t heir per-
fo rmance on cognitive exams did not improve 
significa ntly, a lthough follow-up surveys may 
yet find an impact. The increased enrollments in 
Uganda a nd India were apparently only mod-
estly accommodated by increased school materi-
a ls and so school qua lity may have suffered for 
a ll children. Nevertheless, there is no consist-
ent finding that students perfo rm more poorly 
in larger classrooms, especially in the range 
of pupil- teacher ratios observed in develop-
ing coun tries. Furthermore, our strategy begins 
with the group of students who started school. 
and so any increase in pupil- teacher ratios 
wo uld occur because more s tudents are stay-
ing in school and not because formerly absent 
students are now attend ing. Our view is that the 
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tie between years of schooling and lifet ime earn-
ings is sufficiently strong that the benefits will 
yet become apparent as these children age, even 
if they do not appear immediately. It should be 
emphasized that, in most of the cases summa-
rized in table 4.5, improved cognitive ability did 
accompany the increased time in school when 
both were measured. 
In designing these programs, efforts to sup-
plement existing supply by working outside the 
government school system are generally less 
expensive and subject to fewer regulatory con-
straints. Such priva te sector educational pro-
grams will be most effective in urban areas where 
the elasticity of educational supply is greatest. 
Health programs offer opportuni ties for collat-
eral educational benefits while improving child 
welfare. 
We should emphasize that where there a re 
binding pace constraints in school, stimulating 
demand will not be eiTective without a concomi-
tant increase in supply. However, programs that 
require an increase in supply are much more 
expensive than programs that exploit existing 
excess school capacity. Secondly, programs that 
can make better use of extsting resources such 
as those that reduce teacher absenteeism or 
enhance pa rental commttment to the school 
show promise but arc sti ll in preliminary test-
ing. More work is needed to see how these 
programs can be generalized. Finally, we know 
teacher and school quality matter, but we do 
not know how to foster qua li ty. Until we do, 
we cannot make a proposal focusing on quality 
enhancements. 
In our estimates of the benefits of demand-
side policy prescriptions, we assume a forty-five-
year work career. In our projection of lifetime 
earnings, we implici tly assume that the value of 
time outside the market rises in value at the same 
rate as the value of time in the labor market. 
This assumption is particula rly suspect in the 
cases where women are not commonly found 
in the labor market, as in the Pakistan example. 
On the other hand, we do not make any adjust-
ments for possible external benefits of women's 
education such as healthier children and reduced 
fertility which would create a bias in the other 
direction, and note further that the literature has 
not demonstrated that returns to girls' schooling 
are substantially lower than are returns to boys' 
schooling. We also make no adjustments for any 
possible additional external benefits from better-
functioning labor markets, more efficient use of 
capital and technology, or better-functioning 
government institutions. Finally, we assume 
that the benefits of the intervention are confined 
to the individual child who was the ta rget of 
the intervention. It is plausible that benefi ts 
may cross generations, in tha t more-educated 
parents can better provide for their children, 
but such projections are even more speculative 
than the labor market earnings projections that 
underlie our current projections, and those ben-
efits are occurring sufficiently far into the future 
that they will be heavily discounted. We expect 
that our more limited measure of the likely 
returns to schooling will counteract any upward 
bias in returns attributable to our ignoring any 
lower quality in the schools available to these 
children. 
We provide summary information on benefit-
cost ratios for many of the programs mentioned 
above. Ourestimatesconcentrate narrowly on the 
returns from additional years schooling induced 
by the program. This can be misleading in ei ther 
direction. The reported benefit-cost ra tios will 
be biased downward in that they ignore external 
benefits and benefits from health improvements. 
These biases can be large. Adding the impact 
that increased years of schooling reduces the 
fertility rates of young women, as was found 
in the Colombia PACES case, raised benefit-
cost ratios substantially, to 25.6, instead of 3.3 
when only the earnings benefi ts of schooling are 
included (Knowles and Behrman 2005). 
On the other hand , past returns to schooling 
may over-state the future earnings of previously 
marginalized children whose schooling is dispro-
portionately rising as a result of these programs. 
Such groups may well face more difficulty find-
ing employment and entry into higher-paying 
occupations than have groups who would fi nish 
schooling without public financial support. 
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Why Benefit-Cost Ratios Vary 
It is immediately clear that many of these bene-
fit-cost ratios are large, and some are extremely 
so. The largest tend to be very low-cost hea lth 
interventions in areas with a very clea rly defined 
need, such as 92 percent worm infestation in 
Kenya. Others are low-cost provision of private 
teachers or tuto rs for under-served poor children 
in urban Pakistan and in India. The very high 
benefit-cost ratios are attributable both to the 
selection o f very low-cost interventions and to 
the placement of these interventions in settings 
where they would be disproportionately suc-
cessful. The expansion of these programs more 
broadly would occur in less fruitful a reas and 
at higher costs, implying tha t the benefit-cost 
ratios would fall. The key point is that even very 
substantial corrections for selection would still 
suggest that these programs were worthwhile. 
The more broadly distributed interventions 
such as the conditio nal cash transfer programs 
or the voucher plans are less selective in terms 
of the places where the interventions a re imple-
mented, and as a result the benefits are more 
modest. In those cases, the la rgest benefits are 
found when they target populations that a re 
initially out of school. For the Mexican Progresa 
intervention, cash transfers to younger children 
were almost certainly not cost-effective because 
most of the children were already in school. 
The cost per increased year o f schooling at the 
primary level was roughly six times the cost of 
inducing an additional year of schooling at the 
seconda ry level. 
Another generalization that is apparent in 
ta ble 4.5 is tha t the largest benefit-cost ratios 
a re interventions early in the child's life because 
the interventio ns cost less and the child 's oppo r-
tunity costs are small. Nevertheless, some pro-
grams targeted at o lder children can still be 
cost-effective if the costs are modest. The iro n 
supplement aimed at secondary s tudents had 
substantial benefits because the costs were so 
low. The benefits were more modest from the 
Colombia PACES program because the voucher 
was more costly, a lthough recall that the benefits 
are more substantia l when the collateral benefit 
of reduced fertility was included. Important!\ 
neither the iron supplement program nor th; 
voucher program required bui ldingmoreschoo s 
o r adding capacit}, a key to keeping their CO)iS 
low relative to their benefits. 
Conclusions 
In examining the pattern of results in table 4.5, 
it seems clear that the most cost-effective inter-
ventions occur when chi ldren a re dropping out 
for reasons of malnutrition or treatable illness. 
Often very low-cost interventions offered at the 
school site correct the health problems, impro\'e 
the cognitive capactty of the child, and increa~ 
attendance. While this represents perhaps onl) 
I 0 percent of the ilhteracy problem according 
to the estimates m table 4.5, it is by far the 
most cost-effective solution. School dropout 
attributable to poverty o r chi ld labor is a more 
prevalent problem and requires more expensi\e 
interventions to correct. Nevertheless, the use 
o f conditional cash transfers, capitation grants, 
or school vouchers can sufficiently increase 
li teracy rates so that t he benefits outweigh the 
costs. 
Where possible, education and health inter-
ventio ns should be married, as each will enforce 
the other. lt is cheaper to distribute health and 
nutrition services a t t he school site and, in so 
doing, parents a re more likely to send their chil-
dren to school. W hen the mechanism used to 
increase school demand involves transfers that 
improve a child 's health and nutrition, we also 
improve the child 's cognitive capabilities and 
school performance, ra ising the returns to the 
program. Any addit ional external benefits from 
individual schooling just add to the plus side 
of the ledger. These colla teral benefits come at 
no added cost, lowering the risk and raising the 
expected return to the in tervention. 
T o put o ur st ra tegy in perspective, we esti-
mate tha t every year approximately 14.4 million 
children could be induced to attain li teracy 
in a cost-effective manner because they start 
schooling but drop out before completing grade 
5. We take the fact that they start school as 
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evidence that there is some source of school 
supply in close proximity to the home, and so 
it is the demand side that is const raining their 
completion of five years of schooling. Severa l 
modest-cost mechanisms have been tried to 
stimulate schooling demand for such c hildren by 
lowering the cost of attending school o r by tying 
the receipt of health services. nutritional supple-
ments, or income to child attendance at school. 
Although some programs had higher costs, $250 
would pay for a ll but the most expensive of the 
interventions summarized m table 4.5. That 
means that for $3.6 billion, and perhaps much 
less, we could significantly raise the schooling 
attainment of these 14.4 milhon children by one 
year. To raise their attainment by the 2.5 yea rs 
on average needed to complete the prima ry 
cycle, the cost would come to $9 billion. 
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